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POLITICAL SCIENCE 
The Court of Justice of the European Communities: A Novel 
Judicial Institution 
WERNER FELD 
Moorhead State College, Moorhead 
There is little question that the potential implications 
of the Common Market for America and for Europe 
have stimulated more discussions in the United States 
during the last twelve months than any other topic, with 
the possible exception of Cuba. Yet, while these discus-
sions have ranged far and wide and have covered in-
tensely most aspects of the European Economic Com-
munity-the technical name for the Common Market-
one of its institutions, the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities, has received largely only peripheral 
treatment.1 However, this judicial institution deserves 
greater consideration and scrutiny because over the years 
it has assumed a very significant role in the economic 
development of Western Europe. The Court's decisions 
have potentially far-reaching economic and political im-
plications not only for the relations between the Member 
States of the Common Market, but possibly also for the 
external relations of these states.2 It is even conceivable 
that the Court of Justice may perform similar functions 
for the future unification of Europe as were performed 
by our Supreme Court under John Marshall for the 
strengthening of our newly established national govern-
ment. It appears, therefore, to be appropriate as well as 
timely, to take a closer look at some of the Court's sali-
ent features and to draw attention to the significance of 
certain judgments which it has rendered. 
Organization: As its name suggests, the Court is the or-
gan of adjudication not only for the European Economic 
Community (EEC) , but also for the European Coal and 
Steel Community (Ecsc) and the European Atomic En-
ergy Community (Euratom). The Court as constituted 
today is the direct successor of the Court of Justice of 
the European Coal and Steel Community which had been 
in existence and functioning since 1953. When the Com-
mon Market and Euratom were established in 1958, the 
Court was given a new name but little else was changed. 
The "new" Court took over most of its predecessor's 
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personnel, its localities, and its docket of nearly forty 
cases that were pending. 3 
The Court is composed of seven judges who are ap-
pointed for a term of six years by the common consent of 
the governments of the Member States. The president of 
the Court is elected by his fellow judges for a period of 
three years. After the expiration of their terms, the judges 
may be re-appointed and the president may be re-elected. 
Professor M. A. Donner, the president of the Court, is 
now in his second term. 4 
The judges must be chosen from among persons of 
"undisputable independence" who are qualified to hold 
the highest judicial office in their respective countries or 
who are jurists of high standing. They may be removed 
from office only if, in the uanimous opinion of the other 
members of the Court, they no longer fulfill the required 
conditions or meet the obligations of their office. They 
may, of course, submit their voluntary resignation from 
the Court at any time, and since the inception of the 
Court, a number of justices have vacated their offices in 
this manner. 5 
The judges are assisted by two "advocates-general" 
who are also appointed for six years by the governments 
of the Member States, whose appointments are renew-
able, and who must meet the same professional quali-
fications as the judges. The two advocates-general who 
were appointed when the Court of the Coal and Steel 
Community was established in 1953, are still occupying 
their positions. Their functions are "to present publicly, 
with complete impartiality and independence, reasoned 
conclusions on cases submitted to the Court of Justice, 
with a view of assisting the latter in the performance of 
its duties ... " 6 The advocates-general do not represent 
in any way either the Communities or the public; they 
function only in the interest of justice. It is significant 
that in the nearly hundred judgments rendered by the 
Court up to the end of February, 1963, the opinions of 
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the advocates-general have been accepted by the jus-
tices of the Court in the majority of the cases. Although 
the institution of the advocate-general is unknown in the 
Common Law systems, it is used extensively in procedure 
before France's highest courts. In fact, the advocate-
general in the judicial organization of the Communities 
is modeled after the Commissioner of the French Conseil 
d'Etat, the most important of the French administrative 
courts and the apex of the French administrative court 
system.7 
In principle, the Court sits in plenary session. How-
ever, it is authorized to set up chambers, and two such 
chambers composed of three judges each have been 
established to conduct preliminary examinations or to 
decide certain categories of cases. Yet some cases always 
must be heard by the Court in plenary session; these are 
cases submitted by a Member State or by one of the in-
stitutions of the Communities, or cases referred to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary decision by a munici-
pal court or tribunal of the Member States. Finally, the 
Court sits as a chamber of three judges to decide cases 
arising from proceedings which have been instituted by 
civil servants of the Communities for alleged grievances 
against the institutions employing them. 
Jurisdiction; The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is 
extensive and its breadth attests to the great importance 
of the Court in the structure of the European Commu-
nities. The provisions granting jurisdiction to the Court 
are scattered throughout the Treaties underlying the three 
Communities, the Conventions on the Statute of the 
Court, and the Protocols on Privileges and Immunities 
of the Communities. The governments of the Member 
States are under obligation not to submit any dispute 
concerning provisions contained in these compacts to any 
other judicial institution than the Court of Justice.P 
The primary function of the Court is to ensure the rule 
of law in the interpretation and application of the Trea-
ties and implementing regulations. In order to discharge 
this responsibility, the Court has been given comprehen-
sive jurisdiction over the other organs of the Commu-
nities, the Member States, and private persons and enter-
prises in the Member States. The Treaties provide that 
the Court shall rule on suits of Member States against 
each other for non-fulfillment of the terms of the Trea-
ties, on suits filed by the various institutions of the Com-
munities against each other or by a Member State against 
one of the institutions regarding the legality of one of 
their administrative acts, and on appeals by staff mem-
bers of the institutions against decisions concerning 
them.1° 
In addition, there are three novel jurisdictional fea-
tures which make the Court quite unprecedented and 
which require elaborating comments. Departing from the 
classic doctrine of international law that access to inter-
national tribunals is only open to states, the Treaties 
permit any private person, natural or legal, to bring a 
case before the Court to appeal against the action of one 
of the executive bodies of the Communities. These 
bodies, the High_ Authority of the ECSC and the Com-
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m1ss1ons of the EEC and Euratom, are empowered to 
by-pass the governments and administrations of the 
Member States and to address their regulations and de-
cisions directly to the national subjects. It is therefore 
only fair that, in turn, these individuals should be en-
titled to lodge an appeal against those acts with the 
Court. According to the Treaties, private persons have a 
right to demand the annulment of individual decisions 
affecting them on one of the following grounds : lack of 
legal competence; major violation of procedure; viola-
tion of the Treaties or any rule of law relating to their 
application; and abuse of power which is the exercise 
of power for an improper purpose.11 
Another unique feature of the Court is the right of the 
executive organs of the Communities to file a suit against 
Member States alleged to be defaulting on their Treaty 
obligations. With regard to the particulars of this right, 
the provisions of the Treaties are not uniform. One es-
sential difference is the ability of the ECSC executive or-
gans to apply certain economic sanctions against a Mem-
ber State if the Court upholds their contention that this 
state is in default of its obligations and if the government 
of that state does not comply with the ruling of the 
Court.12 On the other hand, the newer EEC and Euratom 
Treaties do not permit the application of sanctions in 
such a case.1 3 Although this may be considered as a 
backward step from the goal of achieving European po-
litical integration, it must not be overlooked that the 
prospect of creating an unfavorable public image and 
offending public opinion in the Member States may also 
serve as a very effective sanction. Certainly, none of the 
governments of the Member States would care to be 
summoned before the Court by either of the Commis-
sions to hear its action or inaction condemned in law. 
It is noteworthy that the EEC Commission has used 
with vigor its power to bring before the Court of Justice 
the governments of Member States which appeared to 
have violated their obligations under the Treaty. In 1961 
two actions were filed against the Italian government; 
one for restricting the importation of pigs and pork prod-
ucts, and the other for applying to imported radio parts 
a higher tariff than justified by the tariff in force on J anu-
ary 1, 1958, the date to be used for the calculation of 
the progressive tariff reductions. A third suit was brought 
in 1962 against the governments of Belgium and Luxem-
bourg for levying a higher fee on import licenses for 
gingerbread than :was permitted by the "Common Mar-
ket" provisions of the EEC Treaty. In all three cases, 
the Court upheld the contention of the EEC Commission 
that these actions of the Member States constituted vio-
lations of their Treaty obligations and the governments 
involved promptly complied with the rulings of the 
Court.14 A fourth case against the German Federal Re-
public for placing unwarranted restrictions on the impor-
tation of beef was dropped by the EEC Commission in 
April of 1962 after the federal government had rectified 
the alleged violation of the Treaty. 
The third unusual feature of the Court is its power to 
bind domestic jurisdictions in their interpretation and 
application of the three Treaties. The purpose of this 

















power is to prevent six different interpretations and ap-
plications of the Treaties by the national courts which 
could frustrate the goal of a Common Market under 
common rules. To avoid such an undesirable result, the 
Treaties, particularly the EEC and Euratom Treaties, 
provide that whenever questions concerning their inter-
pretation are raised in a case before a national court or 
tribunal from whose decision no appeal lies under na-
tional law, such court or tribunal is obliged to refer the 
question to the Court of Justice of the Communities for 
its ruling. The preliminary decision of this Court with 
regard to the interpretation to be adopted must be ob-
served by the national court in its ruling on the case be-
fore it. This joins the Court of Justice and the national 
jurisdictions into a common system for a common pur-
pose. 
During its 1961-62 term the Court of Justice received 
its first request for a preliminary decision under the 
EEC Treaty. The request came from the Court of Ap-
peals at The Hague and pertained to the interpretation of 
the anti-trust regulations of that Treaty. The ensuing 
ruling of the Court of Justice which clarified these some-
what obscure regulations has been acclaimed as one of 
the most significant judgments rendered since the Court's 
establishment.16 Another preliminary decision by the 
Court was pronounced as recently as February 5, 1963. 
It was based on a request of a Dutch administrative court 
of the last resort which asked for an interpretation of ar-
ticle 12 of the EEC Treaty. This article prohibits the 
introduction of any new duties or other charges on com-
mercial transactions between Member States. The Court 
of Justice held that this article created individual rights 
of private persons in the Common Market countries 
which the national courts had to observe and safeguard!' 
The types of jurisdiction discussed so far do not ex-
haust the comprehensive jurisdictional authority con-
ferred upon the Court by the Treaties. It would exceed 
the scope of this paper to examine or even mention every 
competence the Court possesses.18 Yet, it must have al-
ready become obvious from this limited survey that the 
Court is much more than an international tribunal in the 
traditional sense. Indeed, the functions assigned to the 
Court justify its classification as an administrative and a 
"constitutional" tribunal. As a consequence, it has been 
deemed appropriate to ascribe a "supranational" char-
acter to the Court of Justice since it exercises powers 
normally only possessed by national courts. 
Procedure: The procedure before the Court of Justice is 
divided into two stages. In the first stage it is conducted 
in written form and usually involves the exchange of 
four briefs between the contending parties as well as the 
submission of documentary evidence and supporting pa-
pers. In the second stage, the procedure is oral. It in-
cludes the reading of the report presented by the iuge-
rapporteur (reporting judge) and the hearing by the 
Court of witnesses, experts, and the legal advisors of the 
parties. In accordance with his mission of assisting the 
Court in rendering a just decision, the advocate-general 
can also question witnesses as well as representatives and 
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counsel of the parties. Witnesses and experts may be 
sworn in accordance with the laws of their national 
states. If any violation of their oath is committed and if 
the Court of Justice reports such a violation, the Member 
States are obliged to regard this in the same manner as 
a breach of law before a domestic court and to prosecute 
the violator. The procedure closes with the presentation 
of arguments by the advocate-general in which this offi-
cial presents his opinion on the points of law raised in 
the case and accordingly proposes the ruling he thinks 
appropriate. 20 
A difficult problem in the procedure before the Court 
is the recognition of four official languages: French, Ger-
man, Italian, and Dutch. The Rules of Procedure of the 
Court establish the basic principle that the plaintiff may 
select the language in which the case will be heard. How-
ever, if the defendant is the government of a Member 
State or a natural or legal person residing in a Member 
State, the case is heard in the language of the defendant. 
Since the judges have not been chosen for their linguistic 
ability, but for their knowledge of the law, all documents 
brought before the Court are translated in each of the 
three other languages and during the oral procedure a 
simultaneous translation is provided. Furthermore, all 
publications of the Court such as judgments are pub-
lished in all four official languages, but only the copy in 
the language actually used during the procedure before 
the Court is considered to be authentic. 21 
The deliberations of the Court are private; not even 
the advocates-general participate in the judicial confer-
ence. In the event that differences of opinion arise dur-
ing the deliberations, a vote is taken and the opinion of 
the majority of the judges becomes the basis for the de-
cision. However, the manner of voting is not indicated 
in the judgment which appears as a single uniform deci-
sion. 22 Professor Donner, the president of the Court, has 
defended this practice on the grounds that it protects the 
independence of the judges. Moreover, according to Pro-
fessor Donner, it forces the judges to work out an agree-
ment on the wording of the decision ensuring opinions 
which are understandable throughout the Member States 
of the Communities and which thus contribute to the 
establishment of a common fund of legal notions and 
principles. 28 
The power and importance of the Court is reflected by 
the fact that no formal appeals can be lodged against its 
decisions. The Court rules in the first, last, and only in-
stance on cases before it. In this connection, the advo-
cate-general assumes a particularly significant role since 
he assists in clarifying the factual and legal aspects of a 
case and thus performs to some degree a function which 
is normally fulfilled for other supreme jurisdictions by 
the lower courts. Under certain, specifically prescribed 
circumstances, however, a case may be brought again 
before the Court. A request for review of a decision may 
be made on the grounds that a fact has been discovered 
which is "susceptible of exerting a decisive influence 
upon a judgment." However, the request for review is 
admissible only if such a fact was unknown to the Court 
and to the party requesting review prior to the time the 
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challenged decision was rendered. In addition, the gov-
ernments of Member States, institutions of the Commu-
nities, and any other natural or legal persons may insti-
tute "third-party" proceedings to contest judgments pre-
judicial to their rights that have been rendered without 
their knowledge. Petitioners for such proceedings, how-
ever, must give valid reasons why they were unable to 
participate in the principal proceedings before the 
Court. 2• In two fairly recent decisions, the Court inter-
preted very narrowly the provisions regarding the con-
test of a judgment by third parties.25 It thus cut off the 
possibility of developing these provisions into instruments 
for liberally filing appeals against its decisions. 
What are the powers of the Court to enforce its judg-
ments? As has been pointed out earlier, in actions against 
the governments of the Member States only the ECSC 
Treaty permits the application of sanctions by the Com-
munity's executive organs as a means of enforcing the 
Court's decisions. Against defending parties other than 
the governments of the Member States, however, deci-
sions of the Court can be enforced in all six countries. 
This is done by sending the judgment to the appropriate 
authorities of the Member State concerned and these au-
thorities are obligated to execute it as if it were a local 
judgment. Only the Court of Justice itself can suspend 
the execution of one of its judgments.26 
Conclusions: Up to the end of February, 1963, the Court 
of Justice had rendered 95 judgments and opinions. In-
dividuals and private enterprises freely have instituted 
proceedings before the Court against the decisions of the 
executive organs of the three Communities; on the other 
hand, actions instituted by Member States and executive 
organs of the Communities have remained the exception. 
The main cause for this phenomenon appears to lie in 
the fortunate fact that conflicts arising between the inter-
ests of the Member States have been rather infrequent, 
and if they occurred, they were usually settled by nego-
tiations between the governments involved. On the other 
hand, the interests of different economic groups have 
clashed quite often and the final arbiter in these disputes 
had to be the Court of Justice. 
Two major conclusions can be drawn for this brief 
examination of the Court of Justice. First, the wide ac-
cess to its jurisdiction by private persons, enterprises, the 
institutions of the Communities, and the governments of 
the Member States, coupled with its power to bind na-
tional jurisdictions, has placed the Court in a strong stra-
tegic position to develop a community-wide system of 
public law. This factor, in turn, will have a significant 
influence on the growth of a common, municipal law in 
the Member States. There is little doubt that the case law 
built by the Court will in due time induce the Member 
States to harmonize pertinent segments of their national 
laws, such as anti-trust statutes, either through multi-
lateral conventions or parallel legislation. In this connec-
tion it should be noted that the EEC Treaty recommends 
to the Member States the approximation of their respec-
tive municipal laws to the extent necessary for the func-
tioning of the Common Market. Under certain specified 
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conditions this Treaty even authorizes direct intervention 
by institutions of the EEC to reconcile the legislative and 
administrative rules of the Member States. 27 
The second important conclusion pertains to the con-
sistent compliance of the governments of the Member 
States with adverse decisions of the Court. Not only have 
the national governments bowed to the judgments of the 
Court under the ECSC Treaty which contains the "big 
stick" feature of economic sanctions for enforcement of 
the Court's decisions, but so far, as has been shown ear-
lier, they also have yielded to all adverse decisions ren-
dered under the EEC Treaty which does not provide 
for the application of sanctions. The effect has been that 
the national governments have adjusted their policies in 
accordance with the opinions of the Court instead of 
basing the formulation of their policies solely on what 
they conceived to be their "national interests." 
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that the 
Court plays and will continue to play a significant role 
in the Common Market countries. 29 Indeed, over the 
years, the Court has assumed a much more important 
role than was envisaged by the framers of the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities. This role will 
become even more crucial if in the future the Commun-
ities should be enlarged by the admission of new mem-
bers. The dynamic character of the Common Market 
has attracted governments of states not only in Europe, 
but also in the Middle East. Despite General de Gaulle's 
veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market in Jan-
uary of this year, it appears to be not unlikely that in 
time some additional states such as Denmark, Norway 
and even Britain will be admitted to full membership 
provided that they accept the provisions of the Treaties. 
Should, in the future, an Atlantic Community emerge 
from the growing European Community, the creation 
of an Atlantic Community High Court of Justice, which 
has been suggested, 30 would expand the process of legal 
"harmonization" to both sides of the Atlantic. 
NOTES 
' See for instance Time, February 22, 1963. 
2 At present the Member States are France, West Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. 
' Journal Officiel, October 19, 1958:453/58 and October 25, 
1958:467/ 58 and 468/ 58. For details and functions of the Court 
see Valentine, (1955). In consulting this book, it must be remem-
bered that it was written prior to the establishment of the EEC and 
Eura tom. · 
• Articles 32b ECSC Treaty, 167 EEC Treaty, and 139 Euratom 
Treaty. 
' Articles 5 and 6 of the Statute of the Court. 
0 Articles 32a and b, ECSC Treaty, 166, 167 EEC Treaty, and 
138, 139 Euratom Treaty. 
'For additional information see Schwartz (1954:23-41 and 
138-9). 
• Articles 32 ECSC Treaty, 165 ·EEC Treaty, 137 Euratom 
Treaty, and 95 Rules of Procedure of the Court. 
0 Articles 87 ECSC Treaty, 219 EEC Treaty, and 193 Euratom 
Treaty. 
10 cf. articles 33-43 , 89 ECSC Treaty, 169-184, 215 EEC Treaty, 
and 141- 155, 188 Euratom Treaty. 
u Articles 33 ECSC Treaty, 173 EEC Treaty, and 146 Euratom 
Treaty. The ECSC Treaty offers somewhat broader grounds for 
appeals than the other Treaties. 

























"Article 88 ECSC Treaty. 
" Articles 169, 171 EEC Treaty and 141, 143 Euratom Treaty. 
" EEC Commission v. the Government of the Italian Republic, 
Dec. No. 7 / 61 , December 19, 1961 , 7 Rec. 633 (1961); EEC Com-
mission v. the Government of the Italian Republic, Dec. 10/ 61 , 
February 27, 1962, 8 Rec. 1 (1962); and EEC Commission v. The 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of Belgium, Dec . 
No. 2 and 3/ 62, December 14, 1962, (mimeo.). It is interesting 
to note that in the first case against Italy, the government lifted 
the import restrictions before the Court pronounced its judgment. 
15 Articles 41 ECSC Treaty, 177 EEC Treaty, and 150 Euratom 
Treaty. The provisions in the EEC and Euratom Treaties are more 
extensive than those in the ECSC Treaty. 
10 Kledingverkoopbedrijf Co. de Geus v. Robert Bosch GmbH 
and Willem van Rijo Co. Dec. No. 13/61, April 6, 1962, 8 Rec. 89 
(1962). 
17 Van Gend & Loos Co. v. the Finance Administration of the 
Netherlands, Dec. No. 26/ 62, February 5, 1963, (mimeo.). 
18 Valentine (1955:65-69) analyzes the competence of the Court 
in great detail and classifies the various types of competence under 
ten categories. 
10 cf. Van Routte (1956: 187 note) and Delvaux (1956: 11, 12); 
also Lagrange (1961 :394, 395, 398, 399) and Reuter ( 1961 :403-
405). Further see article 95 of the ECSC Treaty which requires the 
Court to render an advisory opinion on the "constitutionality" of 
certain proposed amendments to the Treaty. 
"" cf. articles 18, 21-29 of the Statute of the Court and article 
40, par. 4 and 57 of the Rules of Procedure. 
2
' Articles 29-31 of the Rules of Procedure. 
22 For details see article 27 of the Rules of Procedure . 
"' Donner (1962:234). 
" Article 41 of the Statute of the Court (EEC Treaty). Similar 
provisions are found in the Statute of the Court in the ECSC and 
Euratom Treaties . 
'-' Breedband Co. v. Societe des Acieries du Temple, the High 
Authority, et al. , Dec. Nos. 42 and 49 / 59, July 12, 1962, 8 Rec. 
275 ( 1962), and The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v. 
Societe Commerciale A. Vloebergh and the High Authority, Dec. 
No. 9 and 12/60, July 12, 1962, 8 Rec. 333 (1962). 
20 Articles 44, 92 ECSC Treaty, 187, 192 EEC Treaty, and 159, 
164 Euratom Treaty. 
07 cf. Articles 3 (h), 100-102 EEC Treaty . 
"'cf. e.g. the decision of Government of the Federal Republic 
of Germany v. the High Authority, Dec. No. 3/ 58, March 8, 1960, 
6 Rec. 117 (1960). 
20 In three very recent decisions the Court squashed attempts 
by interest groups of food producers and marketers to delay the 
gradual creation of the agricultural Common Market in the six 
Member countries. cf. Confederation Nationale des Producteurs de 
Fruits et Legumes et al. v. the EEC Council [of Ministers] , Dec. 
Nos. 16/ 62 and 17/ 62, December 14, 1962, (mimeo.), Federation 
Nationale de la Boucherie en Gros et du Commerce en Gros des 
Proceedings, Volume Thirty-one, No. 1, 1963 
Viandes et al. v. the EEC Council, Dec. Nos. 19, 20, 21 and 22/62, 
December 14, 1962, (mimeo.), and Firma Milchwerke Heinz 
Woehrmann & Sohn et al. v. the EEC Commission, Dec. Nos. 
31/62 and 33 / 62, December 14, 1962, (mimeo.). 
30 See Hartley (1963: 651). 
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